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ABSTRACT
Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in
corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly-traded firms deviate more
from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create
fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. We therefore propose that labor
uses its corporate governance voice to maximize the combined value of its contractual and residual
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I.    Introduction 
On July 12, 1994, as shareholders approved the recapitalization that rendered United the 
largest  majority  employee-owned  company  in  the  world,  UAL  stock  closed  at  $99.25.  On 
December 9, 2002, UAL became a penny stock as, unable to sustain the industry’s highest labor 
costs, it filed for bankruptcy protection. Other airlines vehemently opposed aid to UAL, arguing 
that it had brought on a crisis in the industry by relentlessly driving labor costs up. Robert Roach, 
Jr., the General Vice President for Transportation at the International Association of Machinists 
and  Aerospace  Workers,  United' s  largest  union,  responded,  "Everybody  is  shocked  and 
concerned that the federal government would not be there for American workers as they are for 
rebuilding Afghanistan.”
1  Sam Buttrick, an airline analyst at PaineWebber summarized that “At 
the root of the problem is the simple fact that labor has excessive structural leverage”.
2   
Employee-owned  equity  blocks  are  surprisingly  commonplace  in  the  United  States. 
According  to  the  National  Center  for  Employee  Ownership,  as  of  2002,  employees  owned 
several hundred billion dollars worth of their employers’ stock. This includes 11,000 Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), stock bonus plans, and profit sharing plans through which 8.8 
million  workers  have  over  $400  billion  primarily  invested  in  their  employers’  stocks  –  an 
average investment of about $45,000 per employee. In addition, some 11 million employees hold 
over $160 billion of their employers’ stocks through some 2,200 401(k) plans – about $14,000 
per employee. In the past decade, the biggest growth in employee stock ownership has been 
                                                 
1 Quoted in “Unions Vow to Press Fight for Aid Reconsideration”, by Matt Richtel and Steven Greenhouse, New 
York Times, December 5, 2002.   
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through broad based stock option plans and employee stock purchase plans. Some ten to 25 
million employees own several hundred million dollars worth of their employers’ stock through 
some 8,000 of these plans.   
These figures translate into a significant tier of employee-owned stock in many large, 
publicly traded companies. Although employee ownership of public companies through ESOPs 
and 401(k) plans seldom exceeds ten percent, and that through broad based option and purchase 
plans seldom exceeds 30%, these stakes are nonetheless substantial enough blocks to matter at 
shareholder meetings. Since most ESOPs pass voting rights through to employees, and 401(k) 
plans, broad based stock option plans, and stock purchase plans usually give employees full 
voting rights, these stakes give employees a substantial voice in the corporate governance of 
many large publicly traded US firms.   
Proponents of employee equity ownership hold that these developments are desirable. 
Vanek (1965), Drucker (1978), and Aoki (1984) argue that employee equity ownership leads to a 
convergence  of  employees’  interests  with  those  of  shareholders,  empowers  employees,  and 
lengthens workers’ time horizons. They propose that these effects lead to better overall corporate 
performance. Another argument in favor of employee stock ownership is that labor markets, like 
capital markets, are imperfect; and that these imperfections might induce managers to make 
suboptimal decisions. Giving labor a role in corporate governance might mitigate labor market 
imperfections  and  improve  overall  economic  welfare.    Garvey  and  Swan  (1994),  echoing  a 
similar argument, contend that labor ownership may motivate enhanced efficiency given costly 
and imperfect contracting.  Their main premise is that employees, as well as shareholders, are 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington devastated the US airline industry. 
However most airlines analysts recognize that they accelerated an already looming industry financial crisis. See 
“Righting United Airlines: Nine Flight Plans”, by Julie Edelson Halpert, New York Times, September 10, 2000.   
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residual claimants under incomplete contracting, so vesting some control with labor is ex-ante 
efficient. 
In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that employee equity blockholdings have a 
dark side – they create an entrenched workforce with corporate governance power. Entrenched 
labor,  like  entrenched  management,  can  destroy  value  as  it  strives  to  maximize  its  utility. 
Moreover, like entrenched management, entrenched labor cannot be got rid of easily. 
Our objective is to test empirically these competing hypotheses regarding the effects of 
labor ownership and control. We compare several dimensions of corporate decision-making by 
firms with labor equity ownership and other firms, controlling for exogenous firm characteristics. 
We  find  that  publicly-traded  firms  whose  employees  have  a  greater  voice  in  corporate 
governance deviate more from value maximization, spend less on new capital, take fewer risks, 
grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. 
These results are highly robust.   
We interpret our findings as evidence that extending residual claims to the generality of 
employees is often not an efficient way to align shareholder and labor interests. Employees, like 
creditors, primarily hold a fixed claim on the firm’s cash flow, in the form of wages and salaries. 
If labor as a fixed claimant acquires equity ownership, it obtains a residual claim and a voice in 
corporate governance in addition to its fixed claims. Our evidence is consistent with labor using 
its  corporate  governance  voice  to  maximize  the  total  value  of  its  two  claims  –  the  fixed, 
primarily salary-based, claim and the residual equity-based claim.    
The  corporate  strategies  that  lead  to  shareholder  value  maximization  and  those  that 
maximize  the  combined  value  of  employees’  residual  claim  and  expected  future  wages  and 
benefits can differ markedly. This is especially so since workers’ equity claims are usually small  
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compared to the largely fixed claims associated with their wages and benefits. Yet, in a widely 
held firm, labor’s stake may give it a major voice in corporate governance. We propose that this 
imbalance often allows labor to use its governance voice to push corporate policies away from, 
rather than towards, shareholder value maximization. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
behavior of labor as a corporate stakeholder and present an overview of the relevant literature. 
We describe our sample selection procedure in Section III, and report our empirical results in 
Section IV. Section V contains a brief summary and concluding remarks. 
 
II.    Labor as a Corporate Stakeholder 
Labor’s contractual stream of wages is similar to risky debt, in that it consists of a fixed 
claim on the firm (current and retired labor’s stream of promised wages and benefits) less a put 
option (whose exercise price is the expected value of labor’s claim in bankruptcy). That is, as 
long as the firm’s value exceeds the value of labor’s claim in bankruptcy, the value of labor’s 
wages is invariant to firm value.  For firm value less than labor’s claim under bankruptcy, labor’s 
wage claim is reduced a dollar for every dollar reduction in firm value below this threshold.  
Figure  1  illustrates.    Here  we  generalize  the  term  “bankruptcy”  to  include  any  corporate 
reorganization  that  reduces  or  eliminates  wages  –  even  if  not  implemented  under  formal 
bankruptcy procedures. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that governance power should be vested 
in  those  who  receive  a  firm’s  residual  claim,  and  point  out  that  American  law  reflects  this 
premise. If the put option of bankruptcy is unlikely, employees are usually contractual claimants, 
receiving a fixed wage, and need no voice in corporate governance. Consequently, American 
courts hold that corporations be run in their shareholders’ interests, with management choosing  
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policy variables to maximize shareholder value. Employees’  and other  creditors’  governance 
rights only come into play in the event of bankruptcy, when their contractual claims expire and 
they become residual claimants. 
A hypothetical alternative legal regime would give complete corporate governance power 
to  current  labor.
3    Labor  would  choose  policy  variables  to  maximize  the  value  of  its  fixed 
contractual claims less that of the put option. Given that employees’ careers with their firms are 
finite, we suppose labor has a horizon limitation, beyond which it employs an infinite discount 
rate. Under these assumptions, labor’s objective is equivalent to minimizing the value of the put 
option. Applying standard results in option pricing theory to a comparison of the two regimes 
lets us predict how corporate governance in our hypothetical labor-controlled firm might differ 
from corporate governance in shareholder-controlled firms.   
First, all else equal, the option value (which labor seeks to minimize) is lower if cash 
flows within labor’s time horizon are larger. However, what happens to cash flows in periods 
subsequent  to  labor’s  horizon  does  not  affect  the  option’s  value.  In  contrast,  the  value  of  a 
shareholder-controlled firm is larger whenever sacrificing near-term cash flows raises future cash 
flows sufficiently over any time horizon. Consequently, our hypothetical labor-governed firm 
would avoid some long-term investments that a shareholder-controlled firm would undertake. 
Arguably, debt contracts extending beyond current labor’s tenure might alleviate this under-
investment.   However, this cannot be a complete solution, for external creditors’ claims are 
subordinate  to  current  labor’s  claim  if  debt  payments  are  scheduled  beyond  current  labor’s 
employment tenure.   
                                                 
3 German corporate governance law goes far in this direction, for its codetermination rules grant half the seats on 
corporate supervisory boards to employee representatives.     
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Second, all else being equal, the option value is lower if the variation in operating cash 
flow is smaller during current labor’s horizon. Thus, labor generally finds projects with volatile 
cash flows undesirable, regardless of their net present values. This implies that our hypothetical 
labor-controlled firm should avoid risks that a shareholder-controlled firm would accept.   
Third, these differences should slow the growth rates of our hypothetical labor-controlled 
firms relative to those of shareholder-controlled firms. Possibly, as an unintended benefit, labor 
ownership  might  eliminate  the  over-investment  free  cash  flow  problem  identified  by  Jensen 
(1986). However, labor-managed firms need not follow the NPV rule at all, since labor would 
rank projects with sufficient cash flows and low risk ahead of potentially higher NPV projects. 
This suggests that labor-controlled firms might have lower shareholder values, as measured by 
average Tobin’s q ratios, than otherwise similar shareholder-controlled firms.   
Finally, it makes sense to envision worker effort as a corporate governance variable in a 
worker-controlled  firm.  Shareholder-controlled  firms  use  a  variety  of  incentive  systems  to 
encourage  workers  to  work  harder.  These  tools  are  also  at  the  disposal  of  our  hypothetical 
worker-managed firm. All else equal, however, labor is only concerned with generating enough 
cash flow to cover its wages. Any further increase in operating cash flow is unimportant to labor. 
These  considerations  suggest  that  labor-controlled  firms  might  invest  less  than  would 
shareholder-controlled firms in marginally increased productivity if current cash flows exceed a 
certain level. In addition, labor may use its governance voice to alter its labor-leisure tradeoff to 
permit greater leisure. Thus, we would expect lower productivity levels in such firms.   
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II.A     Labor Control Associated with Equity Ownership by Labor 
In the United States, labor does not gain corporate control rights without acquiring an 
equity stake. However, if other shareholders’ stakes are small, as is often the case in large US 
firms, equity ownership might give labor a corporate governance voice out of proportion to its 
equity block holding. Morck et al. (1988) argue that holding a five percent block of stock lets top 
managers dominate corporate governance. Other authors argue for a higher threshold of control, 
though there is broad  agreement that a stake well below 50% can confer de facto complete 
control on the blockholder.   
These considerations suggest that labor equity ownership might lead to labor gaining a 
controlling voice in corporate governance for a small share of the firm’s residual cash flows. In 
such cases, labor’s desire to protect its human capital and its fixed wage and benefit contract 
within a finite horizon has a real effect on corporate policy. Specifically, labor control, obtained 
with  only  a  small  labor  ownership  stake,  might  lead  to  reduced  long-term  investment,  risk 
avoidance,  slower  growth,  less  concern  with  share  value  maximization,  and/or  reduced 
productivity.   
 
II.B   Previous Work 
Previous work searches for productivity and incentive effects of labor equity ownership. 
One approach consists of examining abnormal returns around labor’s acquisition of equity blocks 
through ESOPs. An ESOP is a tax-qualified defined contribution retirement plan established 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 that invests most of its 
assets in the employer’s stock. Thus, the creation of an ESOP can result in employees acquiring a 
significant block of shares. Consequently, an examination of ESOP announcement returns could  
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provide an insight into the effect of labor ownership. However, results of ESOP announcement 
studies  have  been  inconclusive.  For  instance,  while  Chang  (1990)  finds  positive  abnormal 
returns, Gordon and Pound (1990) report an insignificant average announcement period return.   
ESOPs enjoyed special tax privileges and are subject to provisions not applicable to other 
ownership plans. This can create problems in interpreting empirical findings and may be partially 
responsible for the inconclusive results. For example, does a positive abnormal return upon an 
ESOP announcement reflect expectations of changed labor productivity or expectations of tax 
breaks? Scholes and Wolfson (1990), Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990), and others argue that the 
tax  effects  of  ESOPs  are  limited  and  not  necessarily  bigger  than  those  provided  by  other 
employee  compensation  plans.  However,  Beatty  (1995)  reports  that  ESOP  announcement 
abnormal return is significantly positively related to estimated tax benefits.   
Further  interpretation  problems  arise  because  ESOPs  often  arise  in  connection  with 
corporate takeover defenses. Gordon and Pound (1990) argue that the management of a potential 
takeover target can create an ESOP to modify the firm’s ownership structure in its favor by 
placing  a  block  of  shares  in  friendly  hands.  Thus,  ESOPs  could  be  used  as  a  managerial 
entrenchment tool. However, as Stulz (1988) argues with respect to anti-takeover activities in 
general, management might also use the ESOP as leverage to gain better terms for shareholders 
in a takeover contest. For these reasons, it is difficult to understand the complete effects of 
employee ownership by analyzing ESOP announcement abnormal returns. 
Another approach is to estimate the effect of employee ownership on labor productivity 
and accounting measures of corporate performance. Again, results have not been conclusive. 
Bloom (1986) utilizes a series of augmented Cobb-Douglas production functions to evaluate the 
effects  of  employee  ownership  on  productivity  at  the  firm  level.  He  estimates  the functions  
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cross-sectionally and longitudinally for a large sample of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
firms. He concludes that employee ownership has little or no impact on corporate performance. 
In contrast, Beatty (1995) performs a similar analysis and reports that ESOPs increase sales per 
employee in the first two post ESOP-adoption years if the ESOP replaces no other retirement 
benefit plan. Park and Song (1995) report significant improvements in performance (as measured 
by  return  on  assets,  Tobin’s  q,  and  market-to-book  ratio)  in  the  three  years  following  plan 
establishment.  However,  such  improvements  are  contingent  on  the  presence  of  an  external 
blockholder. Lougee (1999) investigates the long-term effects of ESOP adoption. She concludes 
that her tests provide no evidence that ESOPs improve firm performance. 
 A potential problem with studies that focus on the immediate post-ESOP years is that 
they may capture the residual effects of financial circumstances associated with takeover threats 
or defenses. This matters since ESOPs are sometimes created as takeover defenses or liquidity 
enhancements programs in the presence of financial difficulties.  In addition, given the stock 
allocation rules followed by most ownership plans, it apparently takes time for corporate policies 
and results to reflect the effects of employee influence on management. 
We  address  these  difficulties  in  two  ways.  First,  we  consider  all  labor-owned  equity 
blocks, not just those associated with ESOPs. Since much labor ownership in US publicly traded 
firms does not arise out of ESOPs, this provides us with a substantially larger sample and affords 
us the opportunity to examine possible differences arising from the mode of labor ownership. 
Second,  to  avoid  temporary  or  unusual  financial  circumstances  associated  with  the  events 
leading up to an ESOP, we require that blocks of labor ownership be in place for several years 
before we admit a firm to our sample of labor-controlled firms. By not including the immediately  
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ensuing years, we examine firms more likely to be subject to labor’s governance influences. We 
thus focus on long-term steady state implications of labor equity ownership. 
Another concern with focusing on labor ownership is that control does not automatically 
follow  ownership.  Chang  and  Mayers  (1992)  discuss  how  de  jure  labor  equity  blocks  can 
become  de  facto  management  ownership.  Indeed,  corporate  management,  not  labor  or  its 
representatives, explicitly votes many labor equity blocks. Including such blocks is appropriate 
in other contexts, but not in this study. This is because control over voting shares translates into 
corporate  governance  influence,  and  hence  into  the  strength  with  which  labor’s  objectives 
become manifested in corporate policy.   
Labor-voted equity stakes clearly give labor a voice in corporate governance decisions. 
McElrath and Rowan (1992) find that unions view employee ownership as a way of influencing 
strategic  decision  making  and  restricting  management’s  largely  “unchecked  independence”. 
Anecdotal evidence concurs. For example, Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. places at least one 
ESOP representative on its board if its ESOP owns a minimum 5% of the outstanding shares. 
Similarly, labor nominates four of Weirton Steel’s fourteen directors; and three of UAL’s twelve 
directors represent employees. McKersie (1999) reports that most corporate boards make major 
decisions by consensus, and that this often gives labor-nominated directors significant leverage. 
He quotes one labor-nominated director: “If you work within the system, you can either get a lot 
accomplished or get some projects struck down, even though your opinion may at first be in the 
minority.” McKersie quotes another labor-nominated director’s experience with consensus: “On 
what  I  thought  was  a  fairly  minor  issue,  but  one  that  I  felt  strongly  about,  I  cast  the  only 
opposing vote on the board. It caused a great deal of problems; the other directors could not 
understand how I could be opposed after hearing their point of view. Because there is a tendency  
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to move only on unanimity, it gives (labor-nominated) directors much more influence than I ever 
expected we had.” 
In other cases, employees influence corporate policies directly, i.e., without necessarily 
having board representation. For example, the labor union at Marriott International, working 
with  other  investors,  won  a  1998  proxy  contest  to  prevent  Marriott’s  proposed  dual-class 
recapitalization. The company had intended the dual-class structure as an integral part of its plan 
to split its food service and hotel businesses. Similarly, UAL aborted its acquisition of USAir in 
1995  because  of  employee  opposition.  Voting  power  clearly  enhances  employees’  ability  to 
influence corporate decisions. We are therefore interested in firms where labor votes its stock, 
but not in firms where managers vote labor’s shares. 
 
III.    Empirical Framework 
III.A  Sample Construction 
We  begin  with  the  3,823  definitive  proxy  statements  filed  with  the  Securities  and 
Exchange Commission in 1995. We then exclude filings by mutual funds, real estate investment 
trusts, limited partnerships, subsidiaries, and firms with incomplete data in COMPUSTAT. This 
yields an initial universe of 2,165 proxy statements. We read each of these filings to determine 
the proportion of voting shares owned by employees of each firm. 
We identify 277 firms where employees own at least five percent of outstanding shares as 
reported  in  the  beneficial  ownership  section  of  the  proxy  statement.  In  22  of  these  firms, 
management  exercises  the  right  to  vote  employee-owned  shares.  For  example,  corporate 
executive officers, serving as  ESOP trustees, vote a twenty percent ESOP block in Security 
National Financial. Similarly, five company officers exercise voting control over the 17.95%  
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block of Central Steel & Wire’s profit sharing plan. Since we are interested in labor’s corporate 
control voice, not simply de jure labor ownership, we drop these 22 firms, reducing the sample 
to 2,143. Of these, employees control at least five percent of voting shares in 255 firms. We 
classify these as subject to some degree of labor voice in corporate governance.
4 
We  then  checked  earlier  proxy  statements  for  each  of  the  255  labor  voice  firms  to 
determine the year labor ownership passed the 5% threshold. We denote this as the event year for 
the firm. We exclude 29 firms with event years later than 1990. This is because we wish to 
examine the steady state effects of employee voice in corporate control, and employee stock 
ownership  can  sometimes  result  from  corporate  restructuring  under  financial  distress.  By 
requiring at least five years of labor influence prior to the empirical window we examine, we 
hope to mitigate the effects of any temporary financial problems that might have been associated 
with labor accumulating stock.
5   
Thus, our final labor voice sample consists of 226 firms. Of these, 110 are firms in which 
labor acquired its stake through an ESOP. In 75 firms, labor acquired its stake through non-
ESOP means:  profit sharing, stock bonuses, stock savings, stock purchases, or combinations of 
these and other retirement benefit plans. Labor acquired its equity stake through a combination 
of ESOPs and other channels in the remaining 41 firms. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of 
labor ownership among the labor voice firms. Mean and median labor ownership are 13.16% and 
10.60%,  respectively.  The  minimum  stake  controlled  by  labor  is  five  percent,  while  the 
maximum  is  68.20%.  By  way  of  comparison,  mean  and  median  non-affiliated  block  equity 
                                                 
4 For e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that entrenchment effects begin to dominate at 5% management 
ownership. Also note that the SEC uses a five percent threshold for Schedule 13D filings under the Williams Act 
incorporated in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
5 Admittedly, this approach may introduce some survivorship bias into our analysis, since labor voice firms must 
survive at least five years after the event year to be part of our sample. However, this should bias results in favor of 
the labor voice firms.  
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holdings  among  the  labor  voice  firms  are  8.79%  and  6.00%,  respectively,  while  mean  and 
median managerial ownership for these firms are 13.60% and 6.83%, respectively. Thus, labor is 
the largest blockholder in the typical labor voice firm.   
Our control sample consists of the 1,888 firms reporting no labor equity ownership or 
ownerships lower than five percent in their proxy statements. We regard these firms as largely 
free from labor influences in corporate governance. 
III.B   Variable Definitions 
Our basic strategy is to run regressions explaining corporate performance and strategy 
variables with measures of labor voice and a set of control variables. This section first describes 
our  labor  voice  measures,  and  then  describes  the  variables  employed  in  our  financial 
performance regressions. Finally, we describe variables in the other regressions we also run.   
Labor Voice Measures 
We measure labor voice in several ways. One set of approach uses indicator variables set 
to one if labor votes more than a certain fraction of the shares at the company’s annual general 
meeting. We use five, ten, fifteen, and twenty percent thresholds.  A second approach uses the 
fraction  of  labor-voted  shares  as  a  continuous  variable.  We  also  experiment  with  more 
complicated  specifications,  including  quadratic  and  piecewise  linear  terms.  These  add  no 
significant explanatory power. The relationship between labor voice and our various dependent 
variables is always monotonic. 
Financial Performance Regressions 
Our primary goal is to understand how a labor voice affects corporate governance. A 
major  aspect  of  corporate  governance  is  the  creation  of  wealth  for  shareholders,  which  we 
measure by Tobin’s average q approximated as the market value of common equity plus book  
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values of preferred equity and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets less short-term 
debt. Although it is possible to construct more sophisticated versions of Tobin’s q, Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) show that this relatively simple version performs quite as well as more complicated 
ones. Besides, more sophisticated measures require additional data, which reduces sample size 
and creates another set of econometric problems. Recent studies that employ the simple measure 
of Tobin’s q include Callahan et al (2003) and Hartzell and Starks (2003). 
We do not include regressions explaining profitability measures such as return on asset 
(ROA)  or  profit  margins  (ROS)  as  alternate  specifications.    This  is  because  these  variables 
measure short-term performance.  Although short-term performance might be depressed by some 
governance problems, it might also be elevated by other effects.  For example, profits might be 
elevated if risk averse labor voice firms sacrificed long-term performance to build up a cash 
cushion.  In a sufficiently efficient stock market, market-to-book ratios incorporate such trade-
offs  and  accurately  reflect  net  gains  in  present  value  terms.  Of  course,  market  irrationality, 
among other things, can distort market-to-book ratios. When we rerun the regressions in our 
tables with ROA or ROS as the dependent variable, our labor voice measures are insignificant.   
We recognize that labor voice is only one of many variables that may affect a firm’s 
ability to create wealth. To estimate the marginal effect of labor influence, we must control for 
other governance and non-governance factors related to Tobin’s q. These include board size 
(Yermack,  1996),  board  composition  (Rosenstein  and  Wyatt,  1990),  leadership  structure 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991), managerial equity ownership (Morck et al, 1988),
6 block ownership 
(Bethel et al., 1998), the availability of investment opportunities (Yermack, 1996), and current 
                                                 
6 Following Morck et al. (1988), the empirical corporate finance literature typically uses breakpoints to control for 
managerial ownership. We employ the same breakpoints as in Morck et al. (1988), i.e., ownership levels of less than 
5%, between 5% and 25%, and greater than 25%. Our results are invariant to other breakpoints, as well as to a single 
continuous measure of managerial ownership.  
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profitability (Yermack, 1996). We hand-collect governance data (board size, board composition, 
leadership  structure,  managerial  equity  ownership,  and  block  ownership)  from  1995  proxy 
statements and use the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets as a proxy for the availability 
of investment opportunities. Our measure of current profitability is return on assets, defined as 
the ratio of operating income to total assets at the beginning of the year. We obtain data on 
capital expenditures, operating income, and total assets from COMPUSTAT. 
In  addition,  we  control  for  debt  because  leverage  may  alter  a  firm’s  contracting 
environment and significantly enhance or hinder its ability to create shareholder wealth. We 
measure leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets using data from COMPUSTAT. 
We also control for whether managers’ compensation is tilted toward equity or debt-like, fixed 
payoffs  because  equity  compensation  may  affect  managerial  incentives.  Our  measure  of  the 
structure of managerial compensation is the ratio of the CEO’s option compensation to total 
compensation, which we compute using data from Execucomp. Finally, we employ two-digit 
SIC code dummies to control for industry effects, and use the logarithm of total assets (in 1994 
dollars) to control for firm size. 
As indicated earlier, we wish to focus on long-run steady state effects. We thus compare 
our labor voice firms to control firms over the seven-year period 1995 to 2001. However, it is 
possible  that  labor  ownership  resulted  from  past  financial  problems.  For  example,  labor 
ownership can result from a bailout of the company using pension fund money to set up an 
ESOP, as at Morrison Knudsen Corp in September 1988. Labor ownership may also arise as a 
concession to unions in return for taking pay cuts, as at United Airlines. Establishing a labor-
owned  equity  block  can  also  serve  as  a  defensive  move  against  an  actual  or  feared  hostile 
takeover, as in the well-known Polaroid case. Since Morck et al (1989) and others show that  
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hostile takeovers in this period were often preceded by poor financial performance, a spurious 
correlation problem is again possible, i.e., past performance can result in labor control, as well as 
affect the dependent variable. In Section III.A, we required labor voted equity blocks to have 
been  in  place  for  at  least  five  years  before  admitting  firms  to  our  labor  voice  sample  to 
circumvent this problem. Nevertheless, we consider a number of variables to control for possible 
remaining aftereffects of past financial circumstances. 
The first of these is average ROA calculated for each firm over 1985 to 1989. Including 
this variable should thus capture echoes of any financial problems that triggered the formation of 
the labor equity block. As a robustness check, we also use average historical Tobin’s q ratio, 
calculated also over 1985 to 1989. Our results are not sensitive to the measure of past financial 
performance.  As a further robustness check, we rerun all our regressions including first ROA 
estimated from 1990 through 1994 and then Tobin’s q averaged over the same period.   The 
results again remain virtually unchanged. 
Other Regressions 
In addition to the shareholder value tests, we also compare several other dimensions of 
corporate decision making for the labor voice and control firms. These dimensions are long-term 
investment,  operating  risk,  growth,  and  labor  and  total  factor  productivity.  We  discuss  our 
measures for these variables below.   
We consider two sorts of long-term investment as alternate dependent variables. The first, 
an  investment  rate,  is  denoted  dK/K,  and  is  capital  expenditure  on  new  property,  plant  and 
equipment, normalized by total net property, plant, and equipment. The second is research and 
development  spending,  also  normalized  by  net  property,  plant,  and  equipment  and  denoted  
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R&D/K. Where all other main financial variables (sales, assets, and net income) are reported, but 
R&D is not, we presume it to be negligible and set it to zero. 
Our measure of operating risk is the standard deviation of return on assets. For each year 
t, we calculate the standard deviation of return on assets over the current year and the three 
preceding years, i.e., years t, t-1, t-2, and t-3. We define return on assets as the ratio of operating 
income before depreciation, interest, and taxes to total assets at the beginning of the year. 
We  define  two  measures  of  corporate  growth,  namely,  sales  growth  and  labor  force 
growth. Sales growth is the three-year average growth rate of real sales calculated as 
3 3
3 3










            [1] 
for each year t, where a is the GDP deflator. Labor force growth rate is constructed analogously, 
but without the GDP deflator. 
To  estimate  total  factor  productivity  (TFP),  we  assume  that  each  firm’s  sales  are 
generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form 
a b
it it it K AL Y =                   [2] 
where Yit is net sales for firm i in period t, Lit is the number of employees, Kit is net property, 
plant, and equipment, and A,a, and b are parameters. Unlike Bloom (1986) and Beatty (1995), 
we do not assume a labor ownership augmentation parameter. Rather, we employ residuals from 
our estimation of the logarithmic transformation of [2] as a measure of firm-level TFP, and look 
for any effect associated with labor voice in these residuals. We control for industry factors by 
estimating a separate equation for each two-digit SIC industry group. 
  We compare labor productivity as well as total factor productivity. We measure labor 
productivity by the simple ratio of real sales to the number of employees.  
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III.C  Statistical Tests and Robustness Checks 
We begin our analysis by contrasting the means and medians of the dependent variables 
defined in the previous section for labor voice and control firms. We recognize that these variables 
are often not entirely within management’s control, and so univariate results may sometimes be 
misleading  as  indicators  of  managers’  intentions,  or  corporate  policies.  We  therefore  follow 
simple comparisons of these variables across the two samples with multiple regression analysis. 
This allows us to control for exogenous factors that may affect each aspect of corporate decision-
making. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
IV.A  Shareholder Value 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that average and median Tobin’s q for labor voice firms during 
1995-2001 are 1.019 and 0.875, respectively. These are significantly lower, at the 1% level or 
better, than the corresponding figures for other firms, 1.433 and 1.026. Similarly, although not 
reported in Table 2, average and median Tobin’s q are significantly lower for labor voice firms 
in each of the seven  years, with p-values of 0.05 or less. These  results provide preliminary 
evidence  of  significantly  less  effective  shareholder  wealth  maximization  in  firms  whose 
corporate governance is influenced by a labor voice.    
Table 3 presents regressions of Tobin’s q on labor voice and the governance and other 
controls described in Section III.B. The first column controls for prior financial circumstances 
using  historical  Tobin’s  q,  and  uses  a  continuous  measure  of  labor  voice,  the  percentage  of 
shares voted by employees. Its coefficient is -0.0158, which is significant at the 1% level. This  
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implies that the difference between no labor voice to a 10% labor voted block, the median in the 
labor voice subsample, is a Tobin’s q depressed by 16% in the latter. A similar result obtains if 
we measure labor control using an indicator variable equal to one if labor votes at least five 
percent (column II). The coefficient of -0.2296 implies that labor voice is associated with a 23% 
reduction  in  Tobin’s  q.  Columns  III  and  IV  control  for  prior  financial  circumstances  using 
historical return on assets. Labor voice variable remains negative and significant at the 1% level. 
We also estimate cross-sectional regressions similar to those in Table 3 for each of the 
seven years in our data. Labor voice is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level or 
less in each year. Furthermore, we estimate regressions (not reported) for which the dependent 
variable is the change in average Tobin’s q from 1985-1989 to 1995-2001. We obtain similar 
results: Labor voice is significantly negatively related to the change in average Tobin’s q, with p-
values lower than 0.05. 
A reasonable concern with the above results is whether a five percent equity ownership 
translates into a meaningful governance voice for labor. If not, the regression results may simply 
be picking up other unknown factors associated with labor ownership that depress shareholder 
value. We address this concern by digging deeper into the ownership structure of each of our 
sample firms to identify those cases where labor ownership is most likely to translate into a 
significant corporate governance voice. 
A natural starting point is to raise the minimum employee ownership level required for a 
firm to be considered as subject to labor influence in corporate governance. We therefore repeat 
our regressions using the subset of firms with minimum labor-controlled equity stakes of 10%, 
15%, and 20%, respectively, in place of the full sample of labor voice firms. Results of these 
regressions  appear  in  Table  4.  As  the  table  shows,  the  labor  voice  dummy  is  negative  and  
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significant at less than the 5% level in each case. In addition, the coefficient becomes more 
negative as we increase the minimum stake, from -0.388 for 10% stakes to -0.530 for 20% 
stakes. Note also that there are only 23 firms with labor-voted equity stakes of at least 20% 
(column III). The significant negative coefficient for labor control in this regression suggests a 
particularly strong underperformance by the labor voice firms. 
 Labor’s ability to influence corporate governance may depend not only on the absolute 
voting stake controlled by employees, but also on the makeup of the firm’s other shareholders. 
For  example,  a  labor  stake  of  even  20%  may  mean  nothing  if  managers  own  50%  of  the 
outstanding shares. Similarly, a strong influence may not necessarily accompany labor’s equity 
ownership if there are other significant outside blockholders. For these reasons, Table 5 repeats 
our analysis using only the subsets of labor voice firms where labor owns 10%, 15%, and 20% of 
the shares and this stake is the single largest block in the company’s ownership structure. We 
believe labor’s ability to influence corporate policies is probably greatest in these cases. Again, 
the labor voice variable is negative and statistically significant in each regression. Overall, our 
results  are  inconsistent  with  labor  voting  power  entailing  a  convergence  of  interest  between 
outside  shareholders  and  employees.  Rather,  there  is  strong  indication  of  a  considerable 
reduction in corporate value creation as measured by Tobin’s q ratio. 
 
IV.B  Long-term Investment  
Panel A of Table 2 presents univariate statistics for capital investment rates and research 
and  development  spending  for  our  labor  voice  and  control  firms.  As  the  table  reveals,  both 
measures  of  long-term  investment  are  significantly  lower  in  labor  voice  firms.  The  average 
capital  investment  rate  of  labor  voice  firms  is  8.4%  compared  to  13.3%  for  other  firms.  
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Similarly, R&D expenditure for labor voice firms average 1.3% of total assets, compared to 
3.1% for control firms. In each instance, the difference is significant at the 1% level. Similar 
results hold with respect to medians.
7 
These  univariate  results  suggest  that  labor’s  voice  might  deter  long-term  investment. 
Again,  prior  poor  performance  in  labor  voice  firms  might  affect  these  results.  We therefore 
control for historical financial performance. We also include controls for firm size and several 
dimensions of corporate governance as well as the firm’s investment opportunity set. In addition, 
each  regression  includes  two-digit  SIC  code  dummies  to  control  for  unobservable  industry 
factors.   
Column I of Table 6 presents summary results from regressions for capital investment 
rate. The first row measures labor influence using the percentage of votes controlled by labor, 
while  rows  two  through  four  use  five  percent,  ten  percent,  and  fifteen  percent  threshold 
dummies, respectively, to distinguish labor voice firms. Consistent with the univariate results, 
Table 6 reveals a negative significant relationship between labor voice and capital spending. The 
estimated coefficients imply that, after controlling for past financial circumstances and other 
factors, a ten percentage point increase in labor-controlled equity reduces capital spending by 
about two percent, while a labor voice in corporate governance (as measured by the five percent 
ownership dummy) is associated with a 2.59%  reduction in long-term investment. Since the 
mean and median of capital spending are about twelve and seven percent, respectively, of net 
property, plant and equipment, these are economically significant effects.
8    
                                                 
7 We also compute industry-adjusted R&D expenditures based on 2-digit SICs, and find similar results, i.e., labor 
voice firms invest significantly less in R&D than do control firms.   
8 Only 25 firms with labor stakes higher than 20% have sufficient data for similar regressions. For this group, the 
labor voice dummy is not significant, although it is negative.   
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The second and third columns of Table 6 present results of regressions for research and 
development  expenditure.  Since  we  do  not  have  real  economic  depreciation  data  for  R&D 
investments, our dependent variable is left censored. We thus employ Tobit, rather than OLS, 
regressions. As column II shows, the labor voice variable is not significant in each regression 
estimated over the full sample. However, when we restrict the sample to firms that actually 
invest in R&D during the period, the labor voice variable (as measured by the percentage of 
labor-controlled equity, as well as the five- and ten-percent ownership dummies) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, as reported in the third column of Table 6. Recall that 
more than half of our sample firms report no R&D expenditure during the entire seven-year 
empirical window of our study. These results suggest that labor voice firms that invest in R&D 
invest less than otherwise similar control firms.   
As robustness checks, we rerun all of the above procedures using alternative long-term 
investment measures normalized by total assets and total sales. Using these variants does not 
change our qualitatively conclusions. Further, if we partition the sample into ESOP firms and 
firms with other types of labor ownership, we find no significant differences in the effect of labor 
voice, i.e., labor voice firms tend to reduce long-term investment, irrespective of the means 
through which labor acquired ownership. 
These results are hard to reconcile with the hypothesis that labor equity ownership causes 
workers to advocate shareholders’ interests. McConell and Muscarella (1985) show that stock 
prices rise when firms announce increases to their capital budgets. Chan et al. (1990) show that 
similar positive abnormal returns accompany announcements that firms are increasing their R&D 
budgets.  Likewise,  Eberhart  et  al.  (2004)  report  significantly  positive  long-term  abnormal 
operating performance following R&D increases. These studies and others suggest shareholders  
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believe most firms underinvest in long-term projects. The depressed shareholder value associated 
with  labor  voice  in  section  IV.A  undermines  any  argument  that  labor  voice  firms  might  be 
curtailing value-destroying excess capital spending and R&D.   
 
IV.C  Operating Risk 
Panel A of Table 2 presents univariate comparisons of operating risk for labor voice and 
other  firms.  Mean  and  median  operating  risk  for  labor  voice  firms  are  3.5%  and  2.9%, 
respectively. These are significantly lower at 1% level or better than the comparable figures for 
other firms, 5.5% and 3.9%, respectively. Results are similar when we measure operating risk 
using the standard deviation of operating income scaled by sales.   
Column  IV  of  Table  6  presents  summary  results  from  regressions  for  operating  risk 
analogous to those in the preceding columns for long-term investment and R&D expenditure. In 
the  first  row,  labor  voice  is  labor’s  percentage  voting  power.  Its  coefficient  is  negative  and 
significant  at  the  1%  level.  In  the  second  through  the  fourth  rows,  labor  voice  is a  dummy 
variable  for  5%,  10%,  and  15%  labor  equity  ownership,  respectively.  In  each  case,  the 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level or better.   
As a robustness check, we substitute the standard deviation of return on sales, estimated 
over the same period, as the measure of operating risk. Qualitatively similar results ensue. Next, 
we partition the sample into ESOP firms and firms with other types of labor ownership. We find 
some differences in the effect of labor voice based on the sample partition. The labor voice 
variable is negative and significant for ESOP firms. On the other hand, it is never significant in 
the regressions for firms with other types of labor ownership, although it is also always negative.  
 
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
Thus, it appears that the operating risk results are driven by ESOP firms, which represent 49% of 
our sample of labor voice firms.   
Table  6  indicates  that  a  labor  voice  in  corporate  governance  is  associated  with  a 
significant  reduction  in  corporate  risk  taking.  This  is  consistent  with  risk-averse  employees 
biasing  their  firms’  investment  and  other  decisions  to  reduce  risk.  It  also  provides  further 
evidence  that  labor  influence  in  corporate  governance  need  not  promote  a  convergence  of 
interest between employees and public shareholders. Overall, the evidence on operating risk is 
consistent with labor voice firms curtailing risky investments. 
 
IV.D  Corporate Growth  
Panel A in Table 2 displays univariate statistics for real sales and labor force growth 
rates. Over the seven-year comparison period, labor voice firms achieved average and median 
sales growth rates of 8.6% and 5.7%, respectively; significantly below comparable figures for 
other firms of 13.8% and 8.7% at 1% level or better. Perhaps more importantly, labor voice firms 
create only about half as many net new jobs as other firms. Note that to maintain or increase 
individual  labor’s  wages  while  simultaneously  increasing  total  labor  force  would  require 
profitability and/or efficiency improvements. We have argued and presented evidence against 
both elsewhere in the paper. Put differently, our evidence suggests that labor dislikes a dilution 
of  its  claims  to  corporate  revenues  (including  quasi-rents  in  the  form  of  excess  wages  or 
benefits), just as equity holders dislike a dilution of their claims with new issues.   
Columns V and VI of Table 6 regress real sales and labor force growth rates on labor 
voice  and  our  standard  controls, including historical profitability to control for past financial 
circumstances and 2-digit SIC code dummies for industry factors. The first row uses a continuous  
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labor voice stake, while the second through the fourth rows use labor control thresholds of 5%, 
10%, and 15%, respectively. 
The coefficients of the labor voice dummy in columns V and VI of Table 6 are negative 
and significant for all regressions. The parameter estimates suggest that, after controlling for 
other aspects of a firm’s corporate governance and financial circumstances, real sales growth is 
lower for labor voice firms by 3% to 5%, while employment growth is lower by 3% to 4.5%. 
When labor voice is measured with a continuous variable, the coefficients are -0.22% for sales 
growth and -0.19% for staff growth, indicating that a ten-percentage point increase in labor-
controlled votes reduces real sales growth by 2.2% and employment growth by 1.9%. These 
results do not depend on the mode of labor ownership. Separating ESOP firms from other firms 
with labor voice yields virtually identical results in each subsample. 
 
IV.E  Productivity  
Univariate results for total factor productivity residuals are shown in Panel A of Table 2. 
The average total factor productivity residual for labor voice firms is -0.011, significantly below 
the 0.070 average for other firms at the 1% level. Similarly, median productivity residual for 
labor voice firms is -0.032, compared to 0.050 for other firms. Again, the difference is significant 
at the 1% level. Thus, while the actual output of a typical non-labor-controlled firm represents 
105% of what we would expect based on factor inputs, labor voice firms manage to produce only 
about 97% of expected output on average. This clearly suggests that labor influence in corporate 
governance is associated with noticeably depressed firm-level productivity. 
Column VII of Table 6 examines the robustness of this association to controls for other 
aspects of firm governance and financial circumstances by regressing total factor productivity  
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residuals  on  measures  of  labor  voice  and  the  control  variables  from  Section  III.B. The  first 
regression measures labor influence using the proportion of shares voted by employees, while the 
second, third, and fourth regressions use indicators variables corresponding to 5%, 10%, and 
15% labor ownership, respectively. 
As Table 6 reveals, labor voice is negative and significant in  each regression. These 
results confirm the univariate findings of a substantial depression in factor productivity at labor-
controlled firms. In particular, the coefficient of the labor voice dummy becomes more negative 
at higher employee voting thresholds without losing its statistical significance, despite sharply 
reduced numbers of firms satisfying the labor voice definition.   
A similar conclusion follows for labor productivity. Although Table 2 shows mean and 
median sales per employee to be statistically indistinguishable, column VIII of Table 6 reveals 
significantly depressed labor productivity in labor voice firms. Again, the effect is more negative 
at higher thresholds of employee ownership. The coefficient estimates imply that, compared to 
other firms, real sales per employee is lower by about 17.84% in firms where employees control 
15%  or  more  of  outstanding  voting  shares,  while    labor-voting  power  ten-percent  higher  is 
associated with a real sales per employee 5.4% lower. These productivity results suggest that the 
depressed employee and total factor productivities in labor voice firms are economically, as well 
as statistically, significant.   
We note that our results are not inconsistent with Beatty (1995), who finds depressed and 
enhanced  productivity  associated  with  ESOPs  depending  on  whether  they  replace  existing 
pension plans or not. First, ESOPs usually replace existing pension plans. Second, Beatty (1995) 
studies sales per employee during the first two post-ESOP adoption years. Since troubled firms 
often establish ESOPs as they restructure, a productivity rebound effect is possible – especially  
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in firms that are not in such serious difficulty that they must sacrifice their existing pension 
plans. We exclude the first five years of employee ownership precisely to allow effects of such 
contingent events to fade, and to allow time for employees to use their governance voice to affect 
corporate decision-making. 
 
V.    Conclusions 
Our empirical findings reveal that a longstanding labor voice in corporate governance is 
associated with significantly depressed shareholder value, sales growth, and job creation. This, in 
part at least, appears to reflect a systematic avoidance of certain types of investment – capital 
expenditure,  R&D  spending,  and  high-risk  investments  in  general.  It  also  probably  reflects 
depressed  labor  and  total  factor  productivity  in  firms  whose  employees  influence  corporate 
governance.   
We argue that current labor rationally uses its voice to maximize the value of its equity 
stake plus the present value of its expected future wages and benefits. Since the present value of 
future wages and benefits is much larger relative to the present value of labor’s equity stake in 
most cases, Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that labor is primarily concerned with maintaining 
current and future cash flows sufficient to prevent wage or benefits cuts. This, combined with 
current labor not greatly valuing cash flows that accrue in the distant future, beyond their wage 
and benefits horizons, explains a low-risk, low-investment, and low-growth strategy. Depressed 
productivity may simply reflect labor using its voice to enhance its labor-leisure tradeoff to attain 
greater leisure. However, it might also reflect depressed investment in innovation, which might 
erode the value of current labor’s firm-specific human capital. Further work is needed to clarify 
these issues.    
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Our findings cast a serious doubt on the simple premise that labor equity participation 
causes a convergence of interests between workers and shareholders. It appears that the increased 
governance role acquired by labor following an ownership stake allows employees to influence 
corporate policies in ways beneficial to their narrow interests. Labor appears to use its voice in 
corporate governance to inject employee horizon and firm-specific human capital concerns into 
the firm’s objective function as it maximizes the combined value of its contractual and residual 
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Figure 1:  Shareholders’ and labor’s claim on the firm’s cash flow. 
 
In periods when the firm’s cash flow is lower than w (that is, the region to the left of w in 
the graph), labor receives all cash flow in the form of wages.  If cash flow is greater than 
w  (the  region  to  the  righ  of  w),  then  labor  receives  its  fixed  payment  (w)  while 
shareholders receive the excess of cash flow over w in the form of dividends. The figure 






Cash flow Table 1: Distribution of labor ownership 
 
This table presents information on the distribution of employee equity ownership among our 
final sample of 226 labor voice firms. Initially, we identify 277 firms where employees own at 
least five percent of outstanding shares, as reported in the beneficial ownership section of the 
1995 proxy statement. We drop 22 firms because the labor stake is voted by management. We 
drop an additional 29 firms because the labor stake was acquired after 1990. Thus, the final labor 
voice  sample  consists  of  226  firms.  In  the  table  below,  Ownership  Range  is  the  percent  of 
outstanding shares controlled by employees as reported in the firm’s 1995 proxy statement. 
 
 




5.00% - 9.99%  101  44.69%  44.69% 
10.00% - 14.99%  65  28.76%  73.45% 
15.00% - 19.99%  30  13.27%  86.72% 
20.00% - 24.99%  15  6.64%  93.36% 
25.00% and above  15  6.64%  100.00% 
Full sample  226  100.00%  100.00% 
Mean ownership      13.16% 
Median ownership      10.60% 
Minimum ownership      5.00% 
Maximum ownership      68.20% Table 2: Univariate comparisons of labor control and other firms 
 
Employees at Labor Voice Firms control at least five percent of the firm’s voting shares, while 
employees at Non-labor Voice Firms control less than five percent of the voting shares. Tobin’s 
q is calculated as the ratio of the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred 
equity, and book value of long-term debt to the book value of assets. For each year t, Net Capital 
Investment is average net investment in property, plant, and equipment over years t, t-1, and t-2 
normalized  by  net  property,  plant,  and  equipment.  R&D  Investment  is  the  ratio  of  R&D 
expenditure to total assets. Operating Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of annual return 
on assets over years t, t-1, t-2, and t-3. Sales Growth is calculated as the three-year average 
growth rate of real sales over years t, t-1, and t-2. Staff Growth is calculated in a similar manner. 
Total Factor Productivity is the residual of annual industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production 
functions  estimated  for  each  2-digit  SIC  industry  group.  Sales  per  Employee  is  the  natural 
logarithm of the ratio of annual sales to the number of employees. Insider Ownership is the 
proportion of outstanding voting shares owned by all officers and directors. Block Ownership is the 
percentage of voting shares controlled by unaffiliated holders of five percent or more. Board Size is 
the number of directors. Board Composition is the proportion of directors who are non-employee 
directors with no business or personal relationship with the firm or any of its employee-directors. 
Leadership Structure is a binary variable, which equals one when the CEO also serves as board 
chairman, zero otherwise. Managerial Equity Compensation is the ratio of the value of annual 
options granted the CEO to the CEO’s total annual compensation. Investment Opportunities is the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Firm 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1994 constant dollars. Current Profitability is return on 
assets, calculated as the ratio of operating income to total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Historical  Profitability  is  average  return  on  assets  over  1985-1989.  Historical  Tobin’s  q  is 
average  Tobin’s  q  ratio  over  1985-1989.  All  non-corporate  governance  variables  (except 
Historical  Tobin’s  q  and  Historical  Profitability)  are  averages  over  1995-2001.  Corporate 
governance variables are from 1995 proxy statements and/or annual reports. For each variable, 
***, **, and * indicate that the value for Labor Voice Firms is significantly different from the 
value for Non-labor Voice Firms at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Table 2 continued: Univariate comparisons of labor control and other firms 
 
 
Variable  Labor voice firms  Non-labor voice firms 
  Sample  Mean  Median  Sample  Mean  Median 
Panel A: Dependent variables           
Tobin’s q  209  1.019
***  0.875
***  1,704  1.433  1.026 
Net capital investment  209  0.084
***  0.048
***  1,658  0.133  0.078 
R&D Investment  226  0.013
***  0.000  1,888  0.031  0.000 
Operating risk  210  0.035
***  0.029
***  1,705  0.055  0.039 
Sales growth  211  0.086
***  0.057
***  1,711  0.138  0.087 
Staff growth  202  0.049
***  0.031
***  1,632  0.098  0.054 
Total factor productivity  204  -0.011
***  -0.032
***  1,650  0.070  0.050 
Sales per employee (log)  208  5.279  5.137  1,694  5.241  5.158 
Panel B: Control variables           
Insider ownership  226  13.595
***  6.825
***  1,888  22.008  14.650 
Block ownership  226  8.790
***  6.000
**  1,888  10.703  7.515 
Board size  226  10.726
 ***  10.000
***  1,888  8.728  8.000 
Board composition  226  0.609
***  0.640
***  1,888  0.558  0.581 
Leadership structure  226  0.726
*  1.000





***  1,888  0.153  0.000 
Investment opportunities  211  0.055  0.048  1,714  0.059  0.049 
Leverage  211  0.195  0.195
*  1,713  0.192  0.164 
Firm size  211  6.940
***  6.890
***  1,714  5.892  5.886 
Current profitability  211  0.139
**  0.145  1,709  0.125  0.133 
Historical profitability  207  0.157  0.154  1,610  0.148  0.143 
Historical Tobin’s q  208  0.908
***  0.850
***  1,647  1.491  1.025 Table 3: Market valuation and labor control 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is Tobin’s q, calculated as the ratio of the sum of 
market value of common equity, book value of preferred equity, and book value of long-term 
debt to the book value of assets. Labor Ownership is the proportion of outstanding voting shares 
controlled by employees; 5% Labor Dummy is an indicator variable, which equals one if labor 
ownership is at least 5%, zero otherwise; Managerial Equity Compensation is the ratio of the 
value  of  annual  options  granted  the  CEO  to  the  CEO’s  total  annual  compensation;  Insider 
Ownership I measures managerial equity ownership up to 5%; Insider Ownership II measures 
managerial equity ownership between 5% and 25%; Insider Ownership III measures managerial 
equity ownership greater than 25%; Block Ownership is the proportion of outstanding voting shares 
controlled by unaffiliated holders of five percent or more; Board Size is the number of directors; 
Board Composition is the proportion of directors who are non-employee directors with no business or 
personal relationship with the firm or any of its employee-directors; Leadership Structure is a binary 
variable,  which  equals  one  when  the  CEO  also  serves  as  board  chairman,  zero  otherwise; 
Investment Opportunities is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt to total assets; Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1994 constant dollars; 
Current Profitability is the ratio of operating income to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
Historical Profitability is the average of return on assets over 1985-1989; Historical Market 
Valuation  is  the  average  of  Tobin’s  q  ratio  over  1985-1989.  All  non-corporate  governance 
variables (except Historical Market Valuation and Historical Profitability) are averages over 
1995-2001.  Corporate  governance  variables  are  from  1995  proxy  statements  and/or  annual 
reports.  Each  regression  includes  2-digit  SIC  industry  dummies  to  control  for  unobservable 
industry factors. Statistically significant variables are shown in bold typeface. The number in 
parentheses under sample size is the number of firms satisfying the definition of labor firms in 
each regression. Table 3 continued: Market valuation and labor control 
 
  I  II  III  IV 
Labor ownership  -0.0158 
(0.01) 
---  -0.0209 
(0.01) 
--- 
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R-square  0.3862  0.3857  0.2784  0.2770 








 Table 4: Market valuation and labor control robustness check 
(higher levels of labor ownership) 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is Tobin’s q, calculated as the ratio of the sum of 
market value of common equity, book value of preferred equity, and book value of long-term 
debt  to  the  book  value of  assets.  10%  Labor  Dummy,  15%  Labor  Dummy,  and  20%  Labor 
Dummy are indicator variables which equal one if labor ownership is at least 10%, 15%, and 
20%, respectively, zero otherwise; Managerial Equity Compensation is the ratio of the value of 
annual options granted the CEO to the CEO’s total annual compensation; Insider Ownership I 
measures managerial equity ownership up to 5%; Insider Ownership II measures managerial 
equity  ownership  between  5%  and  25%;  Insider  Ownership  III  measures  managerial  equity 
ownership  greater  than  25%;  Block  Ownership  is  the  proportion  of  outstanding  voting  shares 
controlled by unaffiliated holders of five percent or more; Board Size is the number of directors; 
Board Composition is the proportion of directors who are non-employee directors with no business or 
personal relationship with the firm or any of its employee-directors; Leadership Structure is a binary 
variable,  which  equals  one  when  the  CEO  also  serves  as  board  chairman,  zero  otherwise; 
Investment Opportunities is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt to total assets; Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1994 constant dollars; 
Current Profitability is the ratio of operating income to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
Historical Profitability is the average of return  on assets over 1985-1989. All non-corporate 
governance variables (except Historical Profitability) are averages over 1995-2001. Corporate 
governance variables are from 1995 proxy statements and/or annual reports. Each regression 
includes 2-digit SIC industry dummies to control for unobservable industry factors. Statistically 
significant variables are shown in bold typeface. The number in parentheses under sample size is 
the number of firms satisfying the definition of labor firms in each regression. Table 4 continued: Market valuation and labor control robustness check 
(higher levels of labor ownership) 
 
  I  II  III 
10% labor dummy  -0.3884 
(0.01) 
---  --- 
15% labor dummy  ---  -0.4909 
(0.01) 
--- 
20% labor dummy 
 






























































































R-square  0.2712  0.2716  0.2720 






 Table 5: Market valuation and labor control robustness check 
(labor owns the largest single block) 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is Tobin’s q, calculated as the ratio of the sum of 
market value of common equity, book value of preferred equity, and book value of long-term 
debt  to  the  book  value of  assets.  10%  Labor  Dummy,  15%  Labor  Dummy,  and  20%  Labor 
Dummy are indicator variables which equal one if labor ownership is at least 10%, 15%, and 
20%, respectively, zero otherwise. In each labor firm, employees own the largest single equity 
block. Managerial Equity Compensation is the ratio of the value of annual options granted the 
CEO to the CEO’s total annual compensation; Insider Ownership I measures managerial equity 
ownership up to 5%; Insider Ownership II measures managerial equity ownership between 5% 
and 25%; Insider Ownership III measures managerial equity ownership greater than 25%; Block 
Ownership is the proportion of outstanding voting shares controlled by unaffiliated holders of five 
percent or more; Board Size is the number of directors; Board Composition is the proportion of 
directors who are non-employee directors with no business or personal relationship with the firm or any 
of its employee-directors; Leadership Structure is a binary variable, which equals one when the 
CEO also serves as board chairman, zero otherwise; Investment Opportunities is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; Firm Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in 1994 constant dollars; Current Profitability is the ratio of operating 
income to total assets at the beginning of the year; Historical Profitability is the average of return 
on  assets  over  1985-1989.  All  non-corporate  governance  variables  (except  Historical 
Profitability) are averages over 1995-2001. Corporate governance variables are from 1995 proxy 
statements  and/or  annual  reports.  Each  regression  includes  2-digit  SIC  industry  dummies  to 
control for unobservable industry factors. Statistically significant variables are shown in bold 
typeface. The number in parentheses under sample size is the number of firms satisfying the 
definition of labor firms in each regression. Table 5 continued: Market valuation and labor control robustness check 
(labor owns the largest single block) 
 
  I  II  III 
10% labor dummy  -0.4150 
(0.01) 
---  --- 
15% labor dummy  ---  -0.5381 
(0.01) 
--- 
20% labor dummy 
 






























































































R-square  0.2715  0.2717  0.2719 






 Table 6: Corporate operations and labor control 
 
This  table  summarizes  results  from  32  regressions  relating  several  aspects  of  corporate 
operations  to  measures  of  labor  control.  DK/K  is  net  investment  in  property,  plant,  and 
equipment normalized by net property, plant, and equipment. R&D is the ratio of research and 
development expenditure to total assets. For each year t, VROA is calculated as the standard 
deviation of annual return on assets over years t, t-1, t-2, and t-3. DSLE is three-year average 
growth rate of real sales. DSTF is three-year average  growth rate of  employees. TFP is the 
residual of annual industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production functions estimated for each 2-
digit SIC industry group. SPE is the natural logarithm of the ratio of annual sales to the number 
of employees. Labor Ownership is the proportion of outstanding shares voted by employees. The 
variables 5% Labor Dummy, 10% Labor Dummy, and 15% Labor Dummy are indicator variables 
which equal one if labor ownership is at least 5%, 10%, and 15%%, respectively, zero otherwise. 
Each regression includes controls for managerial equity compensation as measured by the ratio 
of the value of annual options granted the CEO to the CEO’s total annual compensation, insider 
ownership,  block  ownership,  board  size,  board  composition,  leadership  structure,  investment 
opportunities as measured by the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, leverage as measured 
by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets in 1994 constant dollars, and historical profitability as measured by average annual return on 
assets over 1985-1989, as well as 2-digit SIC industry dummies to control for unobservable 
industry  factors.  All  non-corporate  governance  variables  (except  historical  profitability)  are 
averages  over  1995-2001.  Corporate  governance  variables  are  from  1995  proxy  statements 
and/or annual reports. The first entry in each cell is the coefficient of the labor voice variable 
from each regression. P-values are shown in parentheses under each regression coefficient. The 
first number in the square brackets in each cell is the sample size; it is followed by the number of 
firms satisfying the definition of labor-influenced firms in each regression. Regressions in the 
column labeled R&D I are Tobit regressions estimated over all sample firms, while those in the 
column labeled R&D II are regressions estimated over firms with non-zero R&D expenditures.  
  ￿￿
Table 6 continued: Corporate operations and labor control 
 
 
I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII   
DK/K  R&D I  R&D II  VROA  DSLE  DSTF  TFP  SPE 








































































15% labor dummy  -0.0461 
(0.08) 
[1497/54] 
0.0026 
(0.89) 
[1535/54] 
-0.0531 
(0.74) 
[674/25] 
-0.0113 
(0.06) 
[1582/55] 
-0.0522 
(0.05) 
[1530/54] 
-0.0448 
(0.07) 
[1535/54] 
-0.1497 
(0.02) 
[1700/54] 
-0.1784 
(0.04) 
[1735/55] 
 